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Abstract
We consider marriage problems where myopic and farsighted players in-
teract. To study such problems, we use the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable
set. Blocking occurs by coalitions of size one or two. We require that all
blocking players should strictly improve. We pay particular attention to the
question whether core elements survive in this environment. This is the case
when all players are myopic as well as when all players are farsighted. It
also holds for matching problems satisfying the top-coalition property. For
general matching problems where all women are farsighted, there is only one
core element that can belong to the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set, the
woman-optimal stable matching, so all other stable outcomes are excluded for
sure. If the woman-optimal stable matching is dominated from the woman
point of view by an individually rational matching, then the pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set cannot contain a core element. We show that blocking
by coalitions of arbitrary size leads to identical results.
Key words: Marriage problems, core, stable sets, myopic and farsighted play-
ers.
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1 Introduction
Stability is considered to be a crucial property in marriage problems. A matching
is stable if no individual player prefers to leave his/her current partner and no
pair of players prefers to form a match between them. For marriage problems, this
stability notion is equivalent to core stability. A matching is in the core if there
is no subset of players who can all obtain a strictly preferred outcome by forming
only partnerships among themselves. Gale and Shapley (1962) have shown that
the set of stable matchings, and therefore the core, is non-empty. Both myopic
and farsighted solution concepts point towards the core as the set of reasonable
outcomes. Moreover, both approaches are not able to discriminate between different
core elements.
Several myopic solution concepts coincide with the core. Indeed, although the
core might be a proper subset of the von Neumann-Morgenstern (vNM) stable set
(Ehlers, 2007), which is unique by the results in Wako (2010), the equivalence be-
tween core and vNM stable set is restored by the reformulation of the vNM stable
set in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2017), called the CP vNM set. The
core also coincides with the myopic stable set of Demuynck, Herings, Saulle and Seel
(2019).
Notions like the core, the vNM stable set, the pairwise CP vNM set, and the
myopic stable set are myopic notions since the players do not anticipate that in-
dividual and coalitional deviations are countered by subsequent deviations. These
concepts are based on the direct dominance relation and neglect the destabilizing
effect of indirect dominance relations as introduced by Harsanyi (1974) and Chwe
(1994). Indirect dominance captures the idea that farsighted players can anticipate
the actions of other coalitions and consider the end matching that their deviations
may lead to.
When direct dominance is replaced by indirect dominance in the definition of
the vNM stable set, we obtain the vNM farsightedly stable set.1 Surprisingly, the
1Other approaches to farsightedness in coalition and network formation are the largest con-
sistent set of Chwe (1994), the optimistic and conservative stable standards of behavior of Xue
(1998), the stable set with respect to path dominance in Page and Wooders (2009) and farsightedly
stability as defined in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2009). Non-cooperative approaches
towards farsightedness have been used as well. Bloch (1996) studies the stationary subgame per-
fect equilibria of a dynamic game, whereas Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2004) use an
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core outcomes are still the most relevant ones. Diamantoudi and Xue (2003) have
shown that coalition structures in the core are farsighted stable in hedonic games.
For marriage problems, Mauleon, Vannetelbosch, and Vergote (2011) characterize
the vNM farsightedly stable sets as all singletons that contain a core element. The
equivalence between vNM farsightedly stable sets and singleton core elements ac-
tually holds quite generally in characteristic function games as shown in Ray and
Vohra (2015). Such results are also robust to the incorporation of various forms of
maximality in the indirect dominance relation, like the strong rational expectations
farsighted stable set in Dutta and Vohra (2017) and absolute maximality as in Ray
and Vohra (2019).2
However, the concepts studied so far in the literature do not allow for heterogene-
ity regarding the degree of farsightedness of the players in the market. In this paper,
we allow for the interaction between myopic and farsighted players and propose to
analyze this interaction by means of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. A
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set is the set of matchings satisfying internal and
external stability with respect to the notion of a pairwise myopic-farsighted improv-
ing path. That is, there is no pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from any
matching in the set to another matching in the set (internal stability) and there is
a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from any matching outside the set to
some matching in the set (external stability).
We define a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path as a sequence of match-
ings that can emerge when farsighted players form or destroy matches based on
the improvement the end matching offers relative to the current one while myopic
players form or destroy matches based on the improvement the next matching offers
relative to the current one. Each matching in the sequence differs from the previous
one in that either a new match is formed or an existing one is destroyed. If a match
approach based on rationalizability. Anesi (2010) supports the vNM stable set as a stationary
subgame perfect equilibrium in legislative bargaining games. The dynamic process of coalition
formation by Konishi and Ray (2003) has many features of a non-cooperative equilibrium and can
be obtained as a non-cooperative equilibrium if one allows the process to be history-dependent
as shown in Vartiainen (2011). Kimya (2020) proposes the equilibrium coalitional behavior and
the credible equilibrium coalitional behavior and bridges the non-cooperative and the cooperative
approaches to farsightedness.
2Recent research along these lines allows for heterogeneous expectations in Bloch and van den
Nouweland (2020) and history-dependent expectations in Dutta and Vartianen (2020).
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is destroyed by a myopic player, then this player strictly prefers the resulting match-
ing to the current matching and if a match is destroyed by a farsighted player, then
this player strictly prefers the end matching to the current matching. If a match is
added, then a myopic player involved must strictly prefer the resulting matching to
the current matching and a farsighted player involved must strictly prefer the end
matching to the current matching.
The notion of pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set has been introduced in Her-
ings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020), but differs from the approach in this paper
in one crucial aspect. In Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020) it is sufficient
that one of the two players in a blocking pair makes a strict improvement, whereas
here we require all players involved in an improving path to make strict improve-
ments. This difference turns out to have major implications for the results to be
obtained. Since both this paper and Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020)
assume preferences to be strict, the changes in results are not caused by the classical
problems in matching theory caused by indifferences in the preference relations.
Confirming the earlier literature, in homogeneous societies, where either all play-
ers are myopic or all players are farsighted, the core and the pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set provide the same predictions. Any core element is part of
a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set and elements outside the core are never part
of a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
For the heterogeneous societies, we first identify a condition that restores the
equivalence between the core and the myopic-farsighted stable set. For matching
problems satisfying the top-coalition property, the pairwise myopic-farsighted sta-
ble set is unique and equal to the core. This result holds independently from the
distribution of myopic and farsighted players over the two sides of the marriage
market.
Things become different when the top-coalition property is not satisfied. Con-
sider marriage problems where all women are farsighted. The only core element
that can be part of a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set is the woman-optimal
stable matching. This result shows the when myopic and farsighted players inter-
act, not all core elements are equally relevant. Moreover, if all men are myopic,
then the woman-optimal stable matching can only constitute a pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set if it is not Pareto dominated from the women point of view by
an individually rational matching, i.e., if there does not exist an individually ratio-
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nal matching that is weakly preferred to the woman-optimal stable matching by all
women and strictly preferred by some women. Otherwise, if the woman-optimal sta-
ble matching is Pareto dominated from the women point of view, then no pairwise
myopic-farsighted stable set can be formed by core elements. Under these circum-
stances, the core and the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set will always provide
different predictions. This result shows that the core might not no longer be the
relevant concept when myopic and farsighted players interact.
In the definition of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set, blocking has been
restricted to pairs and single players. Standard notions of the vNM stable set al-
low for blocking by arbitrary coalitions and not only by coalitions of size one or
two. We study whether general blocking is equivalent to pairwise blocking in mar-
riage problems with both myopic and farsighted players. We find that there is an
equivalence between the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set and the coalitional
myopic-farsighted stable set.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020) do not require that all players in-
volved in a myopic-farsighted improving path make strict improvements. In that
case, the woman-optimal stable matching always constitutes a pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set when all women are farsighted. Moreover, it can happen that
other core elements, like the man-optimal stable matching, constitute a pairwise
myopic-farsighted stable set. Finally, the robustness towards coalitional deviations
gets lost.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces marriage problems and
standard notions of stability. Section 3 defines the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable
set. It provides an example where all women are farsighted and all men are myopic
and the unique pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set contains a matching outside
the core. Section 4 presents the analysis on the relation between the core and the
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. Section 5 investigates the equivalence between
pairwise and coalitional blocking. Section 6 compares the results to those in Herings,
Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020). Section 7 contains the conclusion.
2 Marriage Problems
A marriage problem consists of a finite set of players N, partitioned into a set of
men M and a set of women W . The set of non-empty subsets of N is denoted by N .
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Players can be either farsighted or myopic. The farsighted players are collected in the
set F ⊂ N, which is allowed to be empty or equal to N. Myopic players only care
about immediate payoffs, whereas farsighted players take a long-run perspective.
The implications for behavior of being either myopic or farsighted, are made precise
in Section 3.
Each player i ∈ N has a complete and transitive preference ordering i over the
players of the opposite sex and the prospect of being alone. Preferences are assumed
to be strict. We write j ∼i j′ if player i is indifferent between j and j′, which can only
be the case if j = j′, and j i j′ if j i j′ or j ∼i j′. Let = ((m)m∈M , (w)w∈W )
be a preference profile.
A marriage problem is a tuple (M,W,F ). A matching is a function µ : N → N
satisfying the following properties:
(i) For every m ∈M , µ(m) ∈ W ∪ {m}.
(ii) For every w ∈ W , µ(w) ∈M ∪ {w}.
(iii) For every i ∈ N , µ(µ(i)) = i.
The set of all matchings is denoted byM. Given a matching µ ∈M, player i is
said to be single if µ(i) = i. A matching µ is individually rational if each player is
acceptable to his or her partner, so for every i ∈ N it holds that µ(i) i i. Let I be
the set of matchings that are individually rational, i.e.,
I = {µ ∈M | for every i ∈ N , µ(i) i i} .
A matching µ that is not individually rational can be blocked by a single player with
an unacceptable partner. For a given matching µ, a pair {m,w} is said to form a
blocking pair if m and w are not matched to one another but prefer each other to
their partners at µ, i.e. w m µ(m) and m w µ(w). A matching µ is stable if it is
not blocked by any single player or any pair of players.
Given a matching µ ∈ M with man m ∈ M matched to woman w ∈ W, so
µ(m) = w, the matching µ′ that is identical to µ, except that the match between
m and w has been destroyed by either m or w, is denoted by µ − (m,w). Given a
matching µ ∈ M such that m ∈ M and w ∈ W are not matched to one another,
the matching µ′ that is identical to µ, except that the pair (m,w) has formed at
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µ′ and their partners at µ, i.e., µ(w) and µ(m), are now single at µ′, is denoted by
µ+ (m,w).
For every i ∈ N , we extend the preference ordering i over the player’s potential
partners to the set of matchings M in the following way. We say that player i
prefers the matching µ′ to the matching µ if µ′(i) i µ(i) and we write µ′ i µ.
We write µ′ ∼i µ if µ′(i) ∼i µ(i), and µ′ i µ if µ′ i µ or µ′ ∼i µ. For S ∈ N ,
µ(S) = {µ(i) | i ∈ S} denotes the set of partners of players in S at µ. A coalition
S ∈ N is said to block a matching µ ∈ M if there exists a matching µ′ ∈ M such
that µ′(S) = S and µ′ S µ, where µ′ S µ is defined as µ′(i) i µ(i) for every
i ∈ S. The core of the marriage problem (M,W,F,) consists of all matchings that
are not blocked by any coalition. We denote the set of matchings that belong to the
core by C.
It has been shown by Gale and Shapley (1962) that the core of a marriage prob-
lem is non-empty. Also, a matching is stable if and only if it is not blocked by a
coalition of size one or two if and only if it belongs to the core, see Theorem 3.3 in
Roth and Sotomayor (1990). Knuth (1976) has shown that the core of a marriage
problem is a distributive lattice. In particular, there is a man-optimal stable match-
ing µM and a woman-optimal stable matching µW. For any matching µ in the core,
for every m ∈M , it holds that µM m µ. Similarly, for any matching µ in the core,
for every w ∈ W , it holds that µW w µ.
3 The Pairwise Myopic-Farsighted Stable Set
We propose the notion of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set to study the
matchings that are stable when myopic and farsighted players interact with each
other. This notion has been introduced in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch
(2020) when deviating pairs are required to make weak improvements. Here we
require strict improvements for all players involved in a deviation.
A pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path is a sequence of matchings that can
emerge when farsighted players form or destroy matches based on the improvement
the end matching offers them relative to the current one while myopic players form
or destroy matches based on the improvement the next matching in the sequence
offers them relative to the current one.
Definition 1. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. A pairwise myopic-farsighted
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improving path from a matching µ ∈ M to a matching µ′ ∈ M \ {µ} is a finite se-
quence of distinct matchings µ0, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ and µL = µ
′ such that for every
` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1} either (i) or (ii) holds:
(i) µ`+1 = µ` − (m,w) for some (m,w) ∈M ×W such that{
µ`+1(m) m µ`(m) if m ∈M \ F,
µL(m) m µ`(m) if m ∈ F,
or {
µ`+1(w) w µ`(w) if w ∈ W \ F,
µL(w) w µ`(w) if w ∈ F.
(ii) µ`+1 = µ` + (m,w) for some (m,w) ∈M ×W such that{
µ`+1(m) m µ`(m) if m ∈M \ F,
µL(m) m µ`(m) if m ∈ F,
and {
µ`+1(w) w µ`(w) if w ∈ W \ F,
µL(w) w µ`(w) if w ∈ F,
.
Each matching in the sequence differs from the previous one in that either an
existing match in the previous matching is destroyed like in case (i) or a new match
is formed between a man and a woman that are not matched to one another in the
previous matching as in case (ii).
The notion of a pairwise-myopic farsighted improving path differs from the one
in Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020) in that all members involved in a
coalition which is active on the path are required to improve strictly. Even under the
assumption of strict preferences, as assumed in this paper, this makes a difference.
In particular, when a farsighted player is currently involved in a match that is the
same as in the end matching, then the farsighted player is not going to move when
strict improvements for all players are required. On the contrary, if it is sufficient
that at least one of the two players improves strictly, then such a farsighted player
is willing to move together with another player who makes a strict improvement. If
the other player is myopic, then the next matching in the sequence can be either
better of worse for the farsighted player and will be changed at least once more to
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make the farsighted player indifferent with the end matching. If the other player is
farsighted, then both players realize they will get separated from each other in the
end matching, with the indifferent farsighted player returning to his original match.
If there exists a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from a matching µ to
a matching µ′, then we write µ→ µ′. The set of all matchings that can be reached
from a matching µ ∈M by a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path is denoted
by h∗(µ), so
h∗(µ) = {µ′ ∈M | µ→ µ′}.
Example 1. Consider the marriage problem (M,W,F,), which corresponds to
Example 2.31 of Roth and Sotomayor (1990) with the roles of men and women
reversed. It holds that M = {m1,m2,m3} and W = {w1, w2, w3}. Assume F =
{w1, w2, w3}, so all women are farsighted and all men are myopic. The preferences
of the players are as follows.
m1 m2 m3
w1 w3 w1
w2 w1 w2
w3 w2 w3
w1 w2 w3
m2 m1 m1
m1 m2 m2
m3 m3 m3.
By applying the deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962), it can
be easily verified that the woman-optimal stable matching is equal to
µW(m1) = w1,
µW(m2) = w3,
µW(m3) = w2.
The matching µ defined by
µ(m1) = w3,
µ(m2) = w1,
µ(m3) = w2,
is strictly preferred by w1 and w3 to µ
W and does not make a difference for w2.
However, the pair (m1, w2) can block µ, so µ does not belong to the core.
A matching µ ∈ M is said to W -dominate a matching µ ∈ M if µ(i) i µ(i)
for all i ∈ W and µ(i) i µ(i) for some i ∈ W . In this case, we also say that
the matching µ Pareto dominates µ from the woman point of view. We show that
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µ ∈ h∗(µW), so it is possible that farsighted women leave the woman-optimal stable
matching to end up in a matching that W -dominates µW. To see this, consider the
pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µ4 with µ0 = µ
W and µ4 = µ,
where µ1 = µ0 − (m1, w1), µ2 = µ1 − (m2, w3), µ3 = µ2 + (m2, w1), and µ4 =
µ3 + (m1, w3). This pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path is illustrated in
Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path in Example 1 to move from
µW to µ.
The move to µ1 is initiated by w1 who is farsighted and therefore wants to destroy
her match with m1 in the anticipation of ending up in a match with m2. Similarly,
the move from µ1 to µ2 is initiated by w3 who is farsighted and is willing to divorce
m2 in the expectation of being matched with m1. The transition to µ4 = µ is
completed by the subsequent marriages of the single players m2 and w1 and the
single players m1 and w3.
At the same time, it holds that µW /∈ h∗(µ). Indeed, both w1 and w3 are strictly
worse off at µW and w2 is indifferent, so none of the women is willing to add or
destroy a match at µ in the anticipation of ending up at µW. Since all the men are
myopic and have an individually rational match at µ, they are not willing to destroy
a link, so it is not possible to find a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from
µ to µW. It holds that µW /∈ h∗(µ). 4
The pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set results when the conditions of internal
and external stability are based on the pairwise myopic-farsighted improving paths.
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Definition 2. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. A set of matchings V ⊂M
is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set if it satisfies:
(i) Internal stability: For every µ, µ′ ∈ V , it holds that µ′ 6∈ h∗(µ).
(ii) External stability: For every µ ∈M \ V , it holds that h∗(µ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Condition (i) of Definition 2 corresponds to internal stability. For any two match-
ings µ and µ′ in the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set V it does not hold that
µ→ µ′. Condition (ii) of Definition 2 expresses external stability. For every match-
ing µ outside the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set V it holds that there is µ′ ∈ V
such that µ→ µ′.
Recall that in Example 1, the non-core element µ is strictly preferred by two out
of three women to µW, whereas the third woman is indifferent. The next example
shows that {µ} is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. This example is important
since it shows that in heterogeneous societies, it is possible for the farsighted side
to do better than in any core element.
Example 2. We take the same primitives as in Example 1. In Example 1 it has
been shown that µ ∈ h∗(µW). We show now that for every µ ∈ M \ {µ} it holds
that µ ∈ h∗(µ). It then follows that V = {µ} is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable
set.
Let some µ ∈M \ {µ} be given. We distinguish four cases.
Case 1. µ(m1) = w2 and µ(m2) = w1.
It follows that µ(m3) = m3 or µ(m3) = w3. We define µ0 = µ and µ1 = µ0+(m2, w3).
Notice that µ(w3) = m1 w3 µ0(w3) and w3 m2 µ0(m2), so m2 and w3 are willing to
form the match and reach µ1. Next, we take µ2 = µ1 +(m1, w1). The purpose of this
step is to make w2 single. Woman w1 is strictly improving since µ(w1) = m2 w1
w1 = µ1(w1). Man m1 is willing to match w1 since w1 m1 µ1(m1) = w2. Next,
we make w1 and w3 single by setting µ3 = µ2 − (m1, w1) and µ4 = µ3 − (m2, w3).
Woman w1 is willing to destroy the match at µ2 since µ(w1) = m2 w1 m1 and
w3 is willing to destroy the match at µ3 since µ(w3) = m1 w3 m2. Notice that at
µ4, everyone is single. We now define µ5 = µ4 + (m1, w3), µ6 = µ5 + (m2, w1), and
µ7 = µ6 + (m3, w2). It is easily verified that the latter three moves involve strict
improvements for the marrying couple. Since µ7 = µ, we have shown that µ0, . . . , µ7
is a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µ.
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Case 2. µ(m1) = w2 and µ(m2) 6= w1.
We define µ0 = µ and µ1 = µ0 + (m1, w1). Notice that µ(w1) = m2 w1 µ0(w1),
with µ0(w1) = m3 or µ0(w1) = w1, and w1 m1 µ0(m1), so m1 and w1 are willing
to form the match and reach µ1. Woman w2 is now single. At µ1, if w3 is married,
she is willing to destroy the match at µ1, since µ(w3) = m1 w3 m2,m3, moving to
µ2 = µ1− (µ1(w3), w3). Next, we also make w1 single by setting µ3 = µ2− (m1, w1).
Woman w1 is willing to destroy the match at µ2 because µ(w1) = m2 w1 m1. Notice
that at µ3, everyone is single. We now define µ4 = µ3 +(m1, w3), µ5 = µ4 +(m2, w1),
and µ6 = µ5 + (m3, w2). It is easily verified that the latter three moves involve strict
improvements for the marrying couple. Since µ6 = µ, we have shown that µ0, . . . , µ6
is a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µ.
Case 3. µ(m2) = w2.
We define µ0 = µ and µ1 = µ0 + (m2, w1). The purpose of this step is to make w2
single. Notice that µ(w1) = m2 w1 µ0(w1) and w1 m2 µ0(m2), so m2 and w1 are
willing to form the match and reach µ1. Next, we take µ2 = µ1+(m3, w2). Woman w2
is willing to do so since µ(w2) = m3 w2 w2 = µ1(w2). Man m3 is willing to match
w2 since w2 m3 µ1(m3), with µ1(m3) = w3 or µ1(m3) = m3. Now, either µ2 = µ or
we form the remaining match between m1 and w3 moving to µ3 = µ2+(m1, w3) = µ.
Case 4. µ(m3) = w2 or µ(w2) = w2.
We define µ0 = µ. At µ0, if w1 or w3 are not married to their final partner at µ,
then we proceed to divorce them moving to µ1 = µ0 − (µ0(w1), w1) and then to
µ2 = µ1 − (µ1(w3), w3). Next, we form the remaining matches at µ one by one. 4
We show next that {µ} is the unique pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set in
Example 2.
Example 3. We take the same primitives as in Example 2. It follows from the
analysis in Example 2 that for every µ ∈ M \ {µ} it holds that µ ∈ h∗(µ). It then
follows that V = {µ} is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
Suppose now that V is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set that does not
contain µ. By external stability of V , we know that V must contain some matching
in h∗(µ). It can be verified that h∗(µ) = {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4} , where µ1 = µ + (m1, w2),
µ2 = µ1 + (m3, w3), µ
3 = µ1 + (m2, w3) and µ
4 = µ3 + (m3, w1). The move from µ
to µ1 is done by the pair (m1, w2) with both m1 and w2 strictly preferring µ
1 to µ.
Next, the move from µ1 to µ2 is realized by the pair (m3, w3) with both m3 and w3
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strictly preferring µ2 to µ1. Notice that w2 is strictly better off at µ
2 compared to
µ. The move from µ1 to µ3 is realized by the pair (m2, w3) with both m2 and w3
strictly preferring µ3 to µ1. Notice that w2 is strictly better off at µ
3 compared to µ.
And, finally, µ4 is obtained from µ3 by forming the pair (m3, w1) with both m3 and
w1 strictly preferring µ
4 to µ3. Notice that w2 is strictly better off at µ
4 compared
to µ and that w3 is also strictly better off at µ
4 compared to µ1. Thus, we know
that {µ1, µ2, µ3, µ4} ∩ V 6= ∅.
We argue next that µW ∈ h∗(µ1), µW ∈ h∗(µ2), µW ∈ h∗(µ3), and µW ∈ h∗(µ4).
Indeed, we have that µ1 + (m2, w3) + (m1, w1) + (m3, w2) = µ
W and µ2 + (m2, w3) +
(m1, w1) + (m3, w2) = µ
W. The men are myopically improving in each step and
the women all prefer µW to the matching before moving. Also, we have that
µ3 + (m1, w1) + (m3, w2) = µ
W and µ4 + (m1, w1) + (m3, w2) = µ
W. The men
are myopically improving in each step and the women all prefer µW to the matching
before moving. Thus, by internal stability of V , we have that µW /∈ V . It can be
verified that h∗(µW) = {µ} . We therefore have that h∗(µW) ∩ V = ∅, so V violates
external stability, a contradiction. Consequently, there is a unique pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set V = {µ} . 4
Example 3 shows that the unique pairwise myopic-farsighted may not contain a
core element. Hence, Example 3 shows that, in the presence of myopic and farsighted
players, it is possible that the core and the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set
provide different predictions.
4 Pairwise Myopic-Farsighted Stable Sets and the
Core
In this section we investigate the relation between the pairwise myopic-farsighted
stable set and the core.
In the special case where all players are myopic, F = ∅, the pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set is equivalent to the pairwise CP vNM set of Herings, Mauleon
and Vannetelbosch (2017) and is equal to the core.
Mauleon, Vannetelbosch and Vergote (2011) show that the vNM farsightedly sta-
ble sets are characterized as the singletons consisting of a core element. In Section 5
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we show that the results in case coalitions of arbitrary size are allowed to move
coincide with those when moves are made by singletons and pairs. The pairwise
myopic-farsighted stable sets are therefore characterized as singleton core elements
as well in case F = N, so the special case where all players are farsighted.
We now turn to the heterogeneous case. One popular restriction that guarantees
uniqueness of the core is the top-coalition property, introduced by Banerjee, Konishi
and Sönmez (2001).
Definition 3. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. Let S ∈ N . A non-empty
coalition T ⊂ S is a top-coalition of S if every i ∈ T is matched to the most preferred
partner in S. The marriage problem (M,W,F,) satisfies the top-coalition property
if every coalition S ∈ N contains a top coalition of S.
Definition 3 implies that for any group of players there are always two players
that top rank each other or there is a player who prefers to remain single. For
k = 1, . . . , `, let S∗k be a top coalition of N \ ∪k−1j=1S∗j involving one or two players
and let ∪`k=1S∗k = N. The matching µ∗ such that for every i ∈ N there is k ∈
{1, . . . , `} such that S∗k = {i, µ∗(i)} is called the matching induced by the partition
{S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗k} . Banerjee, Konishi and Sönmez (2001) have shown that when the
top-coalition property is satisfied, the core is unique and consists of the matching
µ∗. It follows that the partition {S∗1 , S∗2 , . . . , S∗k} , called the top-coalition partition,
is unique as well.
We show next that for matching problems satisfying the top-coalition property,
the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set is unique and equal to the core.
Theorem 1. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem satisfying the top-coalition
property. Then V is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set if and only if V = C.
Whenever the top-coalition property is satisfied, the core and the pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set make exactly the same predictions. An interesting aspect of
this result is that the distribution of myopic and farsighted players over the two
sides of the market does not matter. Consider the case of a single farsighted player
together with only myopic players. Assume that at some moment in the matching
process, the farsighted player can form a match with another player which makes
the farsighted player strictly better off than in the unique core element. There is no
hope for the farsighted player that such an improvement would be long-lasting.
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We now turn to the case where all women are farsighted, whereas any given man
can be either myopic or farsighted, i.e., W ⊂ F . It is convenient to define the set of
women that strictly prefer a matching µ ∈M to µW by W (µ), so
W (µ) = {w ∈ W | µ(w) w µW(w)}.
It follows from the lattice structure of the core that if µ ∈ C, then we have W (µ) = ∅.
A matching µ ∈ M is said to W -dominate the matching µW if, for every w ∈
W, µ(w) w µW(w) and W (µ) 6= ∅. The next result states that if µW is not W -
dominated by an individually rational matching, then {µW} is a pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set.
Theorem 2. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem with F ⊃ W . Assume that µW
is not W -dominated by a matching in I. Then {µW} is a pairwise myopic-farsighted
stable set.
Proof. Since {µW} is a singleton, Condition (i) of Definition 2, internal stability, is
satisfied. Condition (ii) of Definition 2, external stability, follows from Lemmas 1
and 2 that are proved in the appendix.
Theorems 1 and 2 have some overlap. If a matching problem satisfies the top-
coalition property, then µW cannot be W -dominated by a matching in I, so in case
F ⊃ W, the result of Theorem 1 follows from Theorem 2 as well. Theorem 1 does
not depend on the assumption that F ⊃ W. Theorem 2 makes a weaker assumption
on the preferences, but a stronger assumption on the set of farsighted players.
The proof that µW satisfies external stability relies on Lemmas 1 and 2. We
prove in Lemma 1 that the woman-optimal stable matching µW can be reached
from any matching µ different from µW with the property that, for every w ∈ W,
µW(w) w µ(w). This also covers the case where µ is a core element different from
µW. The proof of Lemma 1 first identifies the set W 1 of women that strictly prefer
µW to µ and that are not single at µ. Since all women are farsighted, they are
willing to divorce their men. The resulting matching is such that all women are
either married to their partner at µW or are single. The latter women now marry
their partner at µW.
Lemma 2 considers the case where the matching µ is such that some women
prefer µ to µW, so the set of women W (µ) that strictly prefer their match at µ to
the one at µW is non-empty. We prove in Lemma 2 that, if µW is not W -dominated
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by a matching in I, then the woman-optimal stable matching µW can be reached
from any matching µ different from µW such that W (µ) 6= ∅.
The proof of Lemma 2 proceeds as follows. In order to reach µW departing from
µ, first the matches that are not individually rational at µ are destroyed until we
arrive at an individually rational matching µk1 . We then identify all the women
that prefer µk1 to µ
W and are married to a farsighted man. Since µW is a core
element, it follows that such a farsighted man prefers µW to µk1 and is willing
to destroy the match with his partner. In this way we obtain a matching µk1+k2
such that all women that prefer µk1+k2 to µ
W are married to a myopic man. If
W (µk1+k2) = ∅, then we can proceed as in the proof of Lemma 1. Consider the
case that W (µk1+k2) 6= ∅. The set of men married to W (µk1+k2) at µk1+k2 cannot
be the same as the set of men married to W (µk1+k2) at µ
W, since otherwise we can
construct an individually rational matching that W -dominates µW, which violates
the assumptions of Theorem 2. Since all women in W (µk1+k2) are married, we can
select a man m0 married to a woman in W (µk1+k2) at µk1+k2 , but is not married
to a woman in W (µk1+k2) at µ
W. We show that the pair (m0, µ
W(m0)) can block
µk1+k2 . More generally, we generate a sequence of blocking pairs (m`, w`) that blocks
µk1+k2+` and such that m` = µ
W(w`). We show that after a finite number of steps
k3 equal to the cardinality of W (µk1+k2), we arrive at a matching µk1+k2+k3 such
that no woman strictly prefers µk1+k2+k3 to µ
W; i.e., W (µk1+k2+k3) = ∅. Thus, the
matching µk1+k2+k3 either coincides with µ
W or satisfies the assumptions of Lemma
1. In the latter case, we complete the pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path
leading to µW as in the proof of Lemma 1.
From Lemmas 1 and 2, it follows easily that {µW} is a pairwise myopic-farsighted
stable set.
We have shown that in case all women are farsighted and µW is not W -dominated
by a matching in I, they can achieve the woman-optimal stable matching µW,
irrespective of whether men are myopic or farsighted.
It follows from the next result that if all women are farsighted and all men are
myopic, then no core element different from µW can be a pairwise myopic-farsighted
stable set.
Theorem 3. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem with F = W . If V ⊂ C is a
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set, then V = {µW}.
The proof of Theorem 3 argues that by internal stability, V ⊂ C cannot contain
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µW together with another core element, so the only possibility besides {µW} for
V ⊂ C to be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set is that V ⊂ C \ {µW}. By
external stability, there should now be a myopic-farsighted improving path from µW
to a core element. But with all women being farsighted, this is impossible.
When the women are farsighted and the men are myopic, the only possible
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set contained in the core consists of the woman-
optimal stable matching. Theorem 2 presents a sufficient condition such that µW is
indeed a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. Theorem 4 shows that this sufficient
condition is also necessary. This result generalizes Example 3 by showing that if
there exists an individually rational matching that W -dominates µW, then no subset
of the core can be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
Theorem 4. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem with F = W . If µW is W -
dominated by a matching in I, then a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set cannot
be contained in C.
The proof of Theorem 4 starts by observing that because of Theorem 3, {µW}
is the only candidate for a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set contained in C.
But {µW} cannot satisfy external stability, since farsighted women and myopic men
will not reach µW by a myopic-farsighted improving path when starting from an
individually rational matching that W -dominates µW.
When all the women are farsighted and all the men are myopic and the woman-
optimal stable matching is W -dominated by an individually rational matching, then
no pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set can be formed by core elements. When this
is the case, the core and the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set will always provide
different predictions. It follows that unlike in the homogeneous cases studied by
the literature so far, the core might not be the relevant concept when myopic and
farsighted players interact.
5 Robustness to Coalitional Deviations
Up to now, in the definition of the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set, blocking
has been restricted to be by pairs and single players. Standard notions of the vNM
stable set allow for blocking by arbitrary coalitions and not only by coalitions of
size one or two. In marriage problems, general blocking is equivalent to pairwise
16
blocking and the core coincides with the set of stable matchings. In this section,
we study whether general blocking is equivalent to pairwise blocking in marriage
problems with both myopic and farsighted players.
Definition 4. Given a matching µ ∈ M, a coalition S ∈ N is able to enforce the
matching µ′ if the following conditions hold: (i) µ′(i) /∈ {µ(i), i} implies {i, µ′(i)} ⊂
S and (ii) µ′(i) = i 6= µ(i) implies {i, µ(i)} ∩ S 6= ∅.
If, given some matching µ, coalition S can enforce matching µ′, then any match
in µ′ that does not exist in µ should be between players in S. Moreover, if a match
in µ is destroyed, then one of the two players involved in that match should belong
to S.
Definition 5. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. A coalitional myopic-
farsighted improving path from a matching µ ∈ M to a matching µ′ ∈ M \ {µ}
is a finite sequence of distinct matchings µ0, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ and µL = µ
′ such
that for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} there is a coalition S` ∈ N that can enforce µ`+1
from µ` and
µ`+1(i) i µ`(i) if i ∈ S` \ F,
µL(i) i µ`(i) if i ∈ S` ∩ F.
Let some µ ∈ M be given. The set of matchings µ′ ∈ M such that there is a
coalitional myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µ′ is denoted by g∗(µ). It
clearly holds that h∗(µ) ⊂ g∗(µ).
Definition 6. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. A set of matchings V ⊂M
is a coalitional myopic-farsighted stable set if it satisfies:
(i) Internal stability: For every µ, µ′ ∈ V , it holds that µ′ 6∈ g∗(µ).
(ii) External stability: For every µ ∈M \ V , it holds that g∗(µ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
The notion of the coalitional myopic-farsighted stable set in Definition 6 coincides
with the definition of the vNM farsightedly stable set of Mauleon, Vannetelbosch
and Vergote (2011) when all players are farsighted. Notice that pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable sets and coalitional myopic-farsighted stable sets would coincide if
g∗ and h∗ would coincide. It has already been observed in Herings, Mauleon, and
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Vannetelbosch (2017) that this is not the case if all players are myopic. Example 4
demonstrates that the same example can be used to show that g∗ and h∗ do not
generally coincide irrespective of whether players are myopic or farsighted.
Example 4. Consider a matching problem (M,W,F,), where M = {m1,m2},
W = {w1, w2}, the set F is taken arbitrary, and the preferences of the individuals
are as follows.
m1 m2
w1 w2
w2 w1
m1 m2
w1 w2
w1 w2
m1 m2
m2 m1
The preferences in Example 4 are such that man m1 prefers to be married to w1
rather than to w2 and m2 prefers to be married to w2 rather than to w1. Also woman
w1 prefers m1 over m2 and woman w2 prefers m2 over m1, but contrary to the men,
women prefer not to be married at all. The matching µ′ is defined by µ′(m1) = w2
and µ′(m2) = w1. The matching µ
∗ is defined by µ∗(m1) = w1 and µ
∗(m2) = w2.
It is immediate that µ∗ ∈ g∗(µ′), since the coalition N can go from µ′ to µ∗ in
one step, leading to a strict improvement for every player.
We argue next that µ∗ /∈ h∗(µ′). The first observation is that at any µ ∈ h∗(µ′)
it holds that at least one of the women is single. Suppose µ0, . . . , µL is a pairwise
myopic-farsighted improving path from µ0 = µ
′ to µL = µ
∗. At µ1, exactly one of
the women is single. Irrespective of whether this woman is myopic or farsighted, she
is not willing to form a match with a man again and it is not possible to reach µ∗.
We have shown that µ∗ /∈ h∗(µ′). 4
The next result demonstrates that g∗(µ) and h∗(µ) are identical for individually
rational matchings µ.
Theorem 5. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. For every µ ∈ I it holds that
g∗(µ) = h∗(µ).
We prove Theorem 5 using Lemma 3 that studies the case where a myopic player
starts from an individually rational match and shows that along a coalitional myopic-
farsighted improving path this player will never be involved in a match that is
not individually rational. It also considers a farsighted player who starts from an
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individually rational match and shows that at the end matching in a coalitional
myopic-farsighted improving path this player is involved in an individually rational
match. Moreover, if such a player is involved in a coalitional move, then the end
matching is strictly preferred to remaining single.
Using Theorem 5 and Lemma 4, which states that any element of a myopic-
farsighted stable set is individually rational, we obtain an equivalence between the
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set and the coalitional myopic-farsighted stable
set.
Theorem 6. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. A set of matchings V ⊂M
is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set if and only if V ⊂ M is a coalitional
myopic-farsighted stable set.
Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2017) show the special case of Theorem 6
where all players are myopic, so F = ∅. When all players are myopic, the set of stable
matchings is also shown to coincide with the core. When all players are farsighted,
so F = N , it follows from Mauleon, Vannetelbosch and Vergote (2011) that the
collection of coalitional myopic-farsighted stable sets is equal to the collection of
singletons each consisting of a core element. For the case F = N, Theorem 6 extends
the result by Mauleon, Vannetelbosch and Vergote (2011) to an equivalence with the
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set in case of individual or pairwise deviations and
improvements are required to be strict for all the players involved in the deviation.
6 Strict versus Weak Improvements
In the definition of a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path, a pair of players
forms a match between them only if both players have a strict preference to do so.
We will refer to this as the case with strict improvements. However, the alternative
assumption that a pair of players forms a match between them if at least one player
has a strict preference to do so can be reasonably entertained as well. We refer
to this as the case with weak improvements. We already explained in detail in
Section 3 that in the presence of farsighted players, the requirement of strict versus
weak improvement matters, even when preferences are strict. The case with weak
improvements was analyzed in Herings, Mauleon, and Vannetelbosch (2020). In this
section, we compare our results to the ones in that paper. This section discusses
how this alternative assumption affects our results.
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We define h(µ) as the set of all matchings that can be reached from a matching
µ ∈M by a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path under the condition of weak
improvements. Let us refer to the stable set that results if we replace h∗ by h in
Definition 2 as the weak pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
Let g(µ) denote the matchings µ′ ∈ M that can be reached from µ ∈ M by a
coalitional myopic-farsighted improving path under the condition of weak improve-
ments, meaning that all players in the coalition improve weakly and at least one
player strictly. Replacing g∗ by g in Definition 6, leads to the weak coalitional
myopic-farsighted stable set.
In Example 1, we have shown that µ ∈ h∗(µW) while µW /∈ h∗(µ). Replacing
strict by weak improvements, we still have that µ ∈ h(µW), but now we also have
that µW ∈ h(µ) despite the fact that all women are farsighted and that µ is strictly
preferred by two out of three women to µW, whereas the third woman is indifferent.
Moreover, Example 2 still holds and V = {µ} is a weak pairwise myopic-farsighted
stable set. However, in Example 3, on top of {µ} now also
{
µW
}
emerges as a weak
pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
The analogue of Theorem 1 for weak improvements has not been studied so far,
but can be shown along the same lines. In case of weak improvements, the analogue
of Theorem 2, {µW} is a weak pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set holds even when
µW is W -dominated by a matching in I. It is therefore easier to sustain µW as the
outcome when only weak improvements are required. The analogue of Theorem 3
does not hold. There are marriage problems satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3
such that core elements different from
{
µW
}
form a singleton weak pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set. The next example presents a matching problem where both{
µW
}
and
{
µM
}
are weak pairwise myopic-farsighted stable sets, which implies that
it is possible to reach the man-optimal stable matching µM from µW.
Example 5. Consider the marriage problem (M,W,F,), whereM = {m1,m2,m3}
and W = {w1, w2, w3} and the preferences of the players are as follows:
m1 m2 m3
w1 w3 w1
w2 w1 w2
w3 w2 w3.
w1 w2 w3
m1 m2 m3
m2 m3 m2
m3 m1 m1
We assume F = W, so all women are farsighted and all men are myopic. Using the
deferred acceptance algorithm of Gale and Shapley (1962) with men proposing and
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with women proposing, it is immediate that the man-optimal and woman-optimal
stable matchings are given by
µM(m1) = w1,
µM(m2) = w3,
µM(m3) = w2.
µW(m1) = w1,
µW(m2) = w2,
µW(m3) = w3,
We first argue that µM ∈ h(µW). To verify this assertion, consider the weak
pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µ4 with µ0 = µ
W and µ4 = µ
M,
where µ1 = µ0 + (m2, w1), µ2 = µ1 + (m3, w2), µ3 = µ2 + (m2, w3), and µ4 =
µ3 + (m1, w1). For an illustration, see Figure 2.
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Figure 2: Myopic-farsighted improving path in Example 5 to move from µW to µM.
Indeed, m2 strictly prefers µ1(m2) = w1 to µ0(m2) = w2 and the farsighted
woman w1 is indifferent between µ4 and µ0. Since now at µ1 woman w2 has become
unmatched, she is willing to form a link with m3, her partner in the end matching
of the sequence, moving from µ1 to µ2. Since µ2(m3) = w2 m3 w3 = µ1(m3),
this is also a myopic improvement for m3. At µ2 woman w3 is unmatched, so she
is willing to team up with m2, her partner in the end matching of the sequence,
leading to the matching µ3. Since µ3(m2) = w3 m2 w1 = µ2(m2), this is also a
myopic improvement for m2. Man m1 and woman w1 are both single at µ3 and are
both happy to marry, which moves them to the end matching µ4 = µ
M.
Consider next any matching µ ∈ M \ {µM, µW}. We argue that µM ∈ h(µ)
by constructing a weak pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µL with
µ0 = µ and µL = µ
M.
Assume first that µ(m1) 6= w1. We define µ1 = µ0 + (m1, w1). Since w1 is the
best partner for m1, this is clearly a myopic improvement for m1. Since m1 is the
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best partner for w1 and µL(w1) = µ
M(w1) = m1, this is a farsighted improvement
for w1.
If µ1 = µ
M, then we have shown that µM ∈ h(µ).
If µ1 = µ
W, then following the weak pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path
from µW to µM constructed at the beginning of the example, we also have µM ∈ h(µ).
If µ1 ∈ M \ {µM, µW}, then w2 or w3 is single under µ1. If w2 is single, then
let her marry m3 and move to µ2 = µ1 + (m3, w2). Since at µ1 man m3 is not
married to w1, this is a myopic improvement for m3. It is also clearly a farsighted
improvement for w2. If w2 is not single, but w3 is, then let her marry m2 and
move to µ2 = µ1 + (m2, w3). Since w3 is the preferred partner of m2, this is clearly
a myopic improvement for m2. It is also clearly a farsighted improvement for w3.
Either µ2 = µ
M and we are done, or µ2 consists of two matched pairs (m1, w1) and
(m3, w2), both being part of µ
M, and two single players, m2 and w3. In this case,
we form the missing pair (m2, w3) from µ
M and move from µ2 to µ3 = µ
M. This
completes the construction of the weak pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path
to µM for the case µ(m1) 6= w1.
Assume next that µ(m1) = w1. We can then proceed with the weak pairwise
myopic-farsighted improving path starting from µ1 as constructed in the previous
paragraph, with µ1 being replaced by µ.
The singleton set V = {µM} trivially satisfies internal stability. Since we have
shown that µM ∈ h(µ) for every µ 6= µM, it also satisfies external stability. It follows
that V = {µM} is a weak pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. 4
The analogue of Theorem 4 does not hold. The set {µW} is a weak pairwise
myopic-farsighted stable set even when it is W -dominated by an individually rational
matching µ ∈ I.
Regarding the results in Section 5, we now present an example to demonstrate
that it is not possible to obtain the analogue of Theorem 5 for the case of weak
improvements.
Example 6. Consider the marriage problem (M,W,F,) with M = {m1,m2,m3}
and W = {w1, w2, w3}. Assume F = {w1}. The preferences of the players are as
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follows, where only the individually rational part is specified.
m1 m2 m3
w1 w2 w3
w2 w3
w1 w2 w3
m1 m1 m2
m2 m3
In the figure it is shown that µ4 ∈ g(µ0).
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Figure 3: Myopic-farsighted improving path to move from µ0 to µ4.
The move from µ0 to µ1 is performed by the coalition {m3, w1, w3}. A link is
formed by the myopic players m3 and w3 and both improve. The link (m1, w1) is
deleted by the farsighted w1, who doesn’t care. The move from µ1 to µ2 is made by
coalition {m1, w2}. Both players are myopic and improve. The move from µ2 to µ3
is performed by the coalition {m2, w3}. Both players are myopic and improve. The
move from µ3 to µ4 is carried out by coalition {m1, w1}. Both players are improving.
This shows that µ4 ∈ g(µ0).
We now argue that µ4 /∈ h(µ0). Suppose µ′0, . . . , µ′L is a pairwise myopic-farsighted
improving path with µ′0 = µ0 and µ
′
L = µ4. At µ
′
0, woman w1 is farsighted and in-
different to the match at µ′L. She is only willing to move if one of the myopic men
would strictly improve marrying her. No man wants to do so, so w1 cannot move
at µ′0. At µ
′
0, the myopic men m1 and m2 are at their best match, so not willing
to move. Although the myopic woman w2 is willing to marry m1, m1 is not willing
to marry w2, so w2 cannot move. The only possibility is that the match (m3, w3)
is formed, so µ′1 is the matching where the pairs (m1, w1), (m2, w2), and (m3, w3)
are all formed. It is easily verified that no moves away from µ′1 are possible. Since
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µ′1 6= µ4, this shows that µ4 /∈ h(µ0). 4
7 Conclusion
We use the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set to study marriage problems where
myopic and farsighted players interact. We assume that players can only deviate if
they improve strictly. For homogeneous cases, where either all players are myopic
or all players are farsighted, every element of a myopic-farsighted stable set is a core
element and every core element belongs to some myopic-farsighted stable set. We
cannot discriminate between different core elements and matchings outside of the
core cannot result. The same result holds for heterogeneous cases when preferences
satisfy the top-coalition property.
But in general, the interaction between myopic and farsighted players leads to
selection of core elements and to matchings that do not belong to the core. When
all women are farsighted and all men are myopic, then the only subset of the core
that can be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set is the singleton consisting of
the woman-optimal stable matching. In case the woman-optimal stable matching is
dominated from the woman point of view by an individually rational matching, then
the woman-optimal stable matching cannot be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable
set and the core and the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set provide different
predictions. These results are robust to the case where coalitional deviations are
allowed, since the pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set is shown to be equivalent to
the coalitional pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
Herings, Mauleon and Vannetelbosch (2020) study the weak pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set, which results when players can deviate if none of them is worse
off and at least one is strictly better off. Even though we assume strict preferences,
the presence of farsighted players makes the two notions different and, indeed, we
obtain quite different results. In the weak improvements case, even if all women are
farsighted and all men are myopic, the woman-optimal stable matching is always
a weak pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set and, depending on the preferences,
it is possible to sustain the man-optimal stable matching. Moreover, coalitional
deviations are not identical to pairwise deviations.
In this paper, the evidence against the core when myopic and farsighted play-
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ers interact is stronger. There is more scope for the farsighted side of a market to
obtain a matching that dominates their optimal matching in the core and thereby
more scope for exploiting the myopic side of the market.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1.
Let {S∗1 , S∗2 , ..., S∗k} be the top-coalition partition and µ∗ the induced matching,
so C = {µ∗}.
First, we show that V = {µ∗} is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set by
showing that for every µ ∈M \ {µ∗} we have that µ∗ ∈ h∗(µ).
Let µ ∈M\{µ∗} be given. We construct a finite sequence of distinct matchings
µ0, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ and µL = µ
∗ such that, for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, there is
a coalition S` ∈ N with cardinality at most two that can enforce µ`+1 from µ` and
µ`+1(i) i µ`(i), if i ∈ S` \ F ,
µL(i) i µ`(i), if i ∈ S` ∩ F .
If the players in S∗1 are not matched under µ, then let S
∗
1 move from µ0 to µ1, with
µ1(S
∗
1) = S
∗
1 . Obviously, it holds that µ1(i) i µ0(i) if i ∈ S∗1 \F , and µL(i) i µ0(i)
if i ∈ S∗1 ∩ F . Next, if the players in S∗2 are not matched under µ1, then let S∗2
move from µ1 to µ2, with µ2(S
∗
2) = S
∗
2 . Since S
∗
2 is a top coalition of N \ S∗1 and
µ1(S
∗
1) = S
∗
1 , it holds that µ2(i) i µ1(i) if i ∈ S∗2\F , and µL(i) i µ1(i) if i ∈ S∗2∩F .
By repeating this argument, we obtain the matching µ∗ after a maximum of k steps.
We have shown that µ∗ ∈ h∗(µ).
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Second, we show that V = {µ∗} is the unique pairwise myopic-farsighted stable
set. We start by showing that h∗(µ∗) = ∅.
Suppose there exists a matching µ ∈ M such that µ ∈ h∗(µ∗). Then there is a
finite sequence of distinct matchings µ0, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ
∗ and µL = µ such that,
for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, there is a coalition S` ∈ N with cardinality at most
two that can enforce µ`+1 from µ` and
µ`+1(i) i µ`(i), if i ∈ S` \ F ,
µL(i) i µ`(i), if i ∈ S` ∩ F .
We use induction to show that, for every j ∈ {1, . . . , k}, S∗j ∩ (S0 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅,
which leads to the desired contradiction. Since S∗1 is a top-coalition of N and
µ∗(S∗1) = S
∗
1 , it clearly holds that S
∗
1 ∩ (S0 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅.
Assume that, for some j ∈ {1, . . . , k− 1}, (S∗1 ∪ · · · ∪S∗j )∩ (S0 ∪ · · · ∪SL−1) = ∅.
It follows that, for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L}, for every i ∈ (S∗1 ∪ · · · ∪ S∗j ), µ`(i) = µ∗(i).
Since S∗j+1 is a top coalition of N \ (S∗1 ∪ · · · ∪S∗j ), it follows that, for every i ∈ S∗j+1,
µ1(i) i µ0(i) and µL(i) i µ0(i), so i /∈ S0 and µ1(i) = µ∗(i). Repeating this
argument, it follows that S∗j+1 ∩ (S0 ∪ · · · ∪ SL−1) = ∅.
We have shown that h∗(µ∗) = ∅.
By external stability as in Definition 2 it follows that µ∗ ∈ V. Since µ∗ ∈ h∗(µ)
for all µ ∈ M \ {µ∗}, internal stability as in Definition 2 implies that V = {µ∗} is
the unique pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.

Lemma 1. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem with F ⊃ W. For every µ ∈
M \ {µW} such that W (µ) = ∅ it holds that µW ∈ h∗(µ).
Proof. Let µ ∈ M \ {µW} be a matching such that W (µ) = ∅. We construct a
pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µL from µ0 = µ to µL = µ
W. Let
W 1 = {w ∈ W | µW(w) w µ(w) and µ(w) ∈M}
be the, possibly empty, set of women who strictly prefer µW(w) to µ(w) and who
are married at µ. Let k1 be the cardinality of W 1. Take an arbitrary order of the
women in W 1, say w0, . . . , wk1−1.
For ` ∈ {0, . . . , k1 − 1}, we define the matching µ`+1 = µ` − (µ`(w`), w`), so the
k1 women in W 1 sequentially destroy their matches. We show that the sequence
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of matchings µ0, . . . , µk1 is the first part of a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving
path from µ to µW by showing that for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , k1 − 1} we have µL(w`) =
µW(w`) w` µ`(w`). This follows since µ`(w`) = µ(w`) and by the definition of W 1.
At µk1 every woman is either single or married to her partner at µ
W. It then
follows that at µk1 every man is either single or married to his partner at µ
W. Let
W 2 = {w ∈ W | µW(w) w µk1(w)}
be the set of women that strictly prefer the match at µW to being single. Let k2
be the cardinality of the set W 2. Take an arbitrary order of the women in W 2, say
w0, . . . , wk2−1. For ` = 0, . . . , k
2 − 1, we define m` = µW(w`).
For ` = 0, . . . , k2 − 1, we define the matching µk1+`+1 = µk1+` + (m`, w`), so
the k2 women in W 2 sequentially marry their partners at µW. It holds that µL =
µk1+k2 = µ
W. Observe that the sequence of matchings µk1 , . . . , µk1+k2 is the final
part of a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µW since it holds
that, for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , k2 − 1},
µk1+`+1(m`) = µ
W(m`) m` m` = µk1+`(m`), if m` ∈M \ F,
µL(m`) = µ
W(m`) m` m` = µk1+`(m`), if m` ∈ F,
µL(w`) = µ
W(w`) w` w` = µk1+`(w`).
Lemma 2. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem with F ⊃ W. Assume that µW
is not W -dominated by a matching in I. For every µ ∈ M such that W (µ) 6= ∅ it
holds that µW ∈ h∗(µ).
Proof. Let µ ∈ M be a matching such that W (µ) 6= ∅. We construct a pairwise
myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µL from µ0 = µ to µL = µ
W. Let
W 1 = {w ∈ µ(M) | µ(w) µ(w) w or w w µ(w)}
be the, possibly empty, set of women that are involved in a match that is not
individually rational for at least one of the partners and denote the cardinality of
W 1 by k1. Take an arbitrary order of the women in W 1, say w0, . . . , wk1−1. For
` ∈ {0, . . . , k1 − 1}, we define m` = µ(w`) to be the man married to w` at µ and we
define the matching µ`+1 = µ` − (m`, w`), so the player who is involved in a match
under µ that is not individually rational destroys his or her match. We argue that
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the sequence of matchings µ0, . . . , µk1 is the first part of a pairwise myopic-farsighted
improving path from µ to µW. Notice that µk1 ∈ I.
Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , k1− 1} be given. It holds that m` m` w` or w` w` m`. In
the former case, we have that
µ`+1(m`) = m` m` µ`(m`), if m` ∈M \ F,
µL(m`) = µ
W(m`) m` m` m` µ`(m`), if m` ∈ F,
whereas in the latter case it holds that
µL(w`) = µ
W(w`) w` w` w` µ`(w`),
so the conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied.
Let
W 2 = {w ∈ W (µk1) | µk1(w) ∈ F}
be the, possibly empty, set of women that prefer their match at µk1 to the one
at µW and that are matched to a farsighted man. We denote the cardinality of
W 2 by k2 and take an arbitrary order of the women in W 2, say w0, . . . , wk2−1. For
` ∈ {0, . . . , k2−1}, we define m` = µk1(w`) to be the man married to w` at µk1 and we
define the matching µk1+`+1 = µk1+` − (m`, w`), so man m` destroys his match with
w`. We argue that the sequence of matchings µk1 , . . . , µk1+k2 is the second part of a
pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µW. Notice that µk1+k2 ∈ I.
Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , k2 − 1} be given. Since m` w` µW(w`) and µW is a core
element, it holds that
µL(m`) = µ
W(m`) m` w` = µk1+`(m`),
so the conditions of Definition 1 are satisfied.
Let
W 3 = W (µk1+k2)
be the set of women that strictly prefer µk1+k2(w) to µ
W(w). By construction of
µk1+k2 it holds that all men in the set µk1+k2(W
3), i.e., the men who are married
to a woman in W 3, are myopic. If W 3 = ∅, then the matching µk1+k2 is equal to
µW or satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 1. In the former case we are done, in the
latter case we proceed as in the proof of Lemma 1 to complete the construction of
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the pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path leading to µW. It remains to consider
the situation where W 3 6= ∅.
We consider two cases.
Case 1. µW(W 3) = µk1+k2(W
3).
In this case, we sequentially marry all women outside W 3 to their partner at
µW, resulting in a matching µ. The matching µ belongs to I and W -dominates the
matching µW, leading to a contradiction with the assumptions of the lemma. This
case can therefore not occur.
Case 2. µW(W 3) 6= µk1+k2(W 3).
For ` ∈ {0, 1, . . .}, whenever µW(W 3+`) 6= µk1+k2+`(W 3+`), select some m` ∈
µk1+k2+`(W
3+`) \ µW(W 3+`) and let w` = µW(m`). This selection of m` is possible
since all women in W 3+` are married at µk1+k2+`, so the cardinality of µk1+k2+`(W
3+`)
is greater than or equal to the cardinality of µW(W 3+`).
We argue that (m`, w`) blocks µk1+k2+`. Let w
′ = µk1+k2+`(m`). By definition of
W 3+`, w′ prefers m` to µ
W(w′) and m` prefers µ
W(m`) = w` to w
′, because otherwise
(m`, w`) blocks µ
W. Since m` /∈ µW(W 3+`), we have that w` /∈ W 3+`, so w` prefers
m` = µ
W(w`) to µk1+k2+`(w`). We have shown that (m`, w`) blocks µk1+k2+`.
We define the matching µk1+k2+`+1 = µk1+k2+`+(m`, w`) andW
3+`+1 = W (µk1+k2+`+1).
Let k3 denote the cardinality of W (µk1+k2). For every ` ≥ 0, at µk1+k2+` man m` is
married to a woman in W 3+` and is married to a woman not in W 3+` at µk1+k2+`+1,
it follows that the cardinality of the set W 3+` is strictly decreasing in `. By the
argument of Case 1, it cannot occur that µW(W 3+`) = µk1+k2+`(W
3+`). Therefore,
we have that W 3+k
3
= ∅.
We argue that the sequence of matchings µk1+k2 , . . . , µk1+k2+k3 is the third part
of a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µW.
Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , k3 − 1} be given. Since the set of men µk1+k2+`(W 3+`) is a
subset of µk1+k2(W
3), it holds that m` is myopic. Since (m`, w`) blocks µk1+k2+`, it
follows that
µk1+k2+`+1(m`) m` µk1+k2+`(m`).
It holds that w` ∈ W \W 3+` and µk1+k2+`(m`) 6= w`, so
µL(w`) = µ
W(w`) w` µ`(w`).
The conditions of Definition 1 are therefore satisfied.
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The matching µk1+k2+k3 is equal to µ
W or satisfies the assumptions of Lemma 1.
In the former case we are done, in the latter case we proceed as in the proof of
Lemma 1 to complete the construction of the pairwise myopic-farsighted improving
path leading to µW.
Proof of Theorem 3.
Suppose that V ⊂ C is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set different from
{µW}. It holds that V ⊂ C \
{
µW
}
, since otherwise Lemma 1 implies that internal
stability would be violated. Since µW /∈ V , by external stability of V , there should
be a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µL from µ0 = µ
W to µL ∈ V .
It holds that µW w µ for all µ ∈ C. Thus, since all women are farsighted, no
woman w ∈ W will form a match with a man m ∈ M to move from µ0 = µW to
µ1 = µ0 + (m,w) in order to finish at µ ∈ C because she cannot strictly improve.
For the same reason, no woman w ∈ W will destroy a match with a man m ∈ M
to move from µ0 = µ
W to µ1 = µ0 − (m,w) in order to finish at µ ∈ C. The only
remaining possibility is that a man destroys a link at µ0 = µ
W. But since µW is
individually rational, this is not profitable. Hence, we conclude that there is no a
pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µL from µ0 = µ
W to µL ∈ V , and
therefore V ⊂ C \ {µW} cannot be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.

Proof of Theorem 4.
Let V ⊂ C be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set. By Theorem 3, the only
possibility is V = {µW}. In order to satisfy external stability in Definition 2, it should
hold that µW ∈ h∗(µ) for every µ ∈ M \ {µW}. However, notice that µW /∈ h∗(µ)
if µ ∈ I W -dominates µW. Since all women are farsighted, no woman w ∈ W will
form a match with a man m ∈ M to move from µ0 = µ to µ1 = µ0 + (m,w) in
order to finish at µW because she cannot strictly improve. For the same reason, no
woman w ∈ W will destroy a match with a man m ∈ M to move from µ0 = µ to
µ1 = µ0 − (m,w) in order to finish at µW. Also, since µ ∈ I, no man can profitably
deviate from µ0 = µ to µ1 = µ0 − (m,w). Hence, we conclude that there is no a
pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path µ0, . . . , µL from µ0 = µ to µL = µ
W, and
therefore {µW} cannot be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.

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Lemma 3. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. Let µ0, . . . , µL be a coalitional
myopic-farsighted improving path from a matching µ ∈ M to a matching µ′ ∈ M.
If i ∈ N \ F and µ(i) i i, then it holds that, for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L}, µ`(i) i i. If
i ∈ F and µ(i) i i, then it holds that µ′(i) i i. If there is ` ∈ {1, . . . , L} such that
i ∈ S` ∩ F and µ(i) i i, then it holds that µ′(i) i i.
Proof. For every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, let S` ∈ N be the coalition that can enforce
µ`+1 from µ` and
µ`+1(i) i µ`(i) if i ∈ S` \ F,
µL(i) i µ`(i) if i ∈ S` ∩ F.
We distinguish two cases.
Case 1. i ∈ N \ F.
We prove by induction that, for every ` = 0, . . . , L, µ`(i) i i. By assumption,
µ0(i) i i. Assume, for some ` = 0, . . . , L− 1, it holds that µ`(i) i i. We show that
µ`+1(i) i i. We distinguish between three cases when moving from µ` to µ`+1 :
Case i. i creates a match with a player different from µ`(i).
Case ii. i becomes single.
Case iii. i is not affected.
In Case i, it holds that µ`+1(i) i µ`(i) i i, in Case ii, that µ`+1(i) = i i i, and
in Case iii, that µ`+1(i) = µ`(i) i i. We have shown that µ`+1(i) i i. It follows
that µ′(i) = µL(i) i i.
Case 2. i ∈ F.
Suppose i i µ′(i). Since µ0(i) i i, it holds that i /∈ S0, so µ1(i) = i (in case
µ0(i) ∈ S0) or µ1(i) = µ0(i) i i. In both cases, it holds that µ1(i) i i. Repeat-
ing this argument, it follows that µ′(i) = µL(i) i i, leading to a contradiction.
Consequently, it holds that µ′(i) = µL(i) i i.
Assume µL(i) = i. Since µ0(i) i i, it follows that i /∈ S0 and µ1(i) = µ0(i)
or µ1(i) = i, so µ1(i) i i. By repeating this argument, we find that, for every
` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, µ`(i) i i. Since moves by coalitions involve strict improvement,
we have that, for every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1}, i ∈ N \ S`. It follows that if there is
` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1} such that i ∈ S`, then µL(i) i i.
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Proof of Theorem 5.
Let some µ ∈ I be given.
Obviously, it holds that h∗(µ) ⊂ g∗(µ).
We show now that g∗(µ) ⊂ h∗(µ). Let µ′ ∈ g∗(µ) be given. There is a finite
sequence of distinct matchings µ0, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ and µL = µ
′ such that, for
every ` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1}, there is a coalition S` ∈ N that can enforce µ`+1 from µ`
and
µ`+1(i) i µ`(i), if i ∈ S` \ F,
µL(i) i µ`(i), if i ∈ S` ∩ F.
Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , L− 1} be given. We define
D0` = {m ∈ S` | µ`(m) ∈ W, µ`+1(m) = m, and µ`+1(µ`(m)) = µ`(m)},
D1` = {w ∈ S` | µ`(w) ∈M \D0` , µ`+1(w) = w, and µ`+1(µ`(w)) = µ`(w)},
as the men in S` who at µ` destroy their match with a woman and the women in
S` who at µ` destroy their match with a man outside D
0
` . The reason to exclude
men in D0` is to avoid double counting. Let D` = D
0
` ∪D1` . The cardinality of D` is
denoted by d`. We will have the players in D` successively destroying their matches
when constructing a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ` to µ`+1. By
Lemma 3 it holds for every i ∈ N \ F that µ`(i) i i, so myopic players in S` are
never destroying matches when going from µ` to µ`+1, and therefore D` ⊂ F. We
define the set A` = {m ∈ S` | µ`(m) 6= µ`+1(m) ∈ W} as the set of men that form
a match when going from µ` to µ`+1. Note that enforceability of µ`+1 implies that
µ`+1(m) ∈ S`. The requirement µ`(m) 6= µ`+1(m) is added to ensure that m does
not simply keep his partner at µ`. The cardinality of A` is denoted by a`.
Take an arbitrary order of the individuals in D`, say i0, . . . , id`−1, and an arbitrary
order of the men in A`, saym0, . . . ,ma`−1.We define ν`,0 = µ`. For k ∈ {0, . . . , d`−1},
we define the matching ν`,k+1 = ν`,k − (ik, µ`(ik)). For k ∈ {0, . . . , a` − 1}, we define
the matching ν`,d`+k+1 = ν`,d`+k + (mk, µ`+1(mk)).
Consider the sequence of distinct matchings
ν0,0, . . . , ν0,d0+a0−1, ν1,0, . . . , νL−1,0, . . . , νL−1,dL−1+aL−1 .
Notice that νL−1,dL−1+aL−1 = µL. We argue that this sequence is a pairwise myopic-
farsighted improving path from ν0,0 = µ to νL−1,dL−1+aL−1 = µ
′.
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Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} and some k ∈ {0, . . . , d` − 1} be given. It holds
that ν`,k+1 = ν`,k − (ik, µ`(ik)). Since ik ∈ D`, we have that ik ∈ F. It holds that
ν`,k(ik) = µ`(ik) ≺ik µL(ik), where the last step uses that ik ∈ S`.
Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , L − 1} and some k ∈ {0, . . . , a` − 1} be given. For wk =
µ`+1(mk), it holds that ν`,d`+k+1 = ν`,d`+k + (mk, wk). First, consider the case where
mk ∈ F. We have µL(mk) mk µ`(mk) and, by Lemma 3, µL(mk) mk mk. It
also holds that ν`,d`+k(mk) = µ`(mk) or ν`,d`+k(mk) = mk. In both cases, we find
that µL(mk) mk ν`,d`+k(mk). The same argument can be used to show that in
case wk ∈ F it holds that µL(wk) wk ν`,d`+k(wk). Second, consider the case where
mk ∈M \ F. Using Lemma 3, we have µ`+1(mk) mk µ`(mk) mk mk. It also holds
that ν`,d`+k+1(mk) = µ`+1(mk) and ν`,d`+k(mk) = µ`(mk) or ν`,d`+k(mk) = mk. In
both cases we find that ν`,d`+k+1(mk) mk ν`,d`+k(mk). The same argument can be
used to show that in case wk ∈ W \ F, then ν`,d`+k+1(wk) wk ν`,d`+k(wk).
We have shown that µ′ ∈ h∗(µ).

Lemma 4. Let (M,W,F,) be a marriage problem. Let V be a pairwise myopic-
farsighted stable set. It holds that V ⊂ I.
Proof. Suppose µ ∈ V is not individually rational. Then there is m ∈ M and
w ∈ W such that µ(m) = w, m m w or w w m. Without loss of generality,
assume m m w. We show that µ /∈ h∗(µ− (m,w)) by distinguishing two cases.
Case 1. m ∈M \ F.
Suppose µ0, . . . , µL is a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ0 = µ −
(m,w) to µL = µ. We prove by induction that, for every ` = 0, . . . , L, µ`(m) m m.
Since µ0(m) = m, it clearly holds that µ0(m) m m. Assume, for some ` = 0, . . . , L−
1, it holds that µ`(m) m m. We show that µ`+1(m) m m. We distinguish between
three cases when moving from µ` to µ`+1 : a. m creates a match with a woman
different from µ`(m); b. m becomes single; c. m is not affected. In Case a it holds
that µ`+1(m) m µ`(m) m m, in Case b that µ`+1(m) = m m m, and in Case c
that µ`+1(m) = µ`(m) m m. We have shown that µ`+1(m) m m. It follows that
µL(m) m m, yielding a contradiction to m m µL(m) = w. Consequently, there is
no pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ− (m,w) to µ if m ∈M \ F.
Case 2. m ∈ F.
Suppose µ0, . . . , µL is a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ0 = µ −
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(m,w) to µL = µ. Since µ− (m,w) m µ, it is not possible that m is involved in the
formation of a match with a woman when moving from µ0 to µ1, so µ1(m) = m. By
repeating this argument, we find that µ1(m) = · · · = µL(m) = m, a contradiction
to µL(m) = w. Consequently, there is no pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path
from µ− (m,w) to µ if m ∈ F.
Combining Cases 1 and 2, we have shown that µ /∈ h∗(µ− (m,w)).
On the other hand, µ − (m,w) ∈ h∗(µ), so by µ ∈ V and internal stability of
V it follows that µ − (m,w) /∈ V. By external stability of V it holds that there is
µ′ ∈ h∗(µ− (m,w)) such that µ′ ∈ V. Since µ /∈ h∗(µ− (m,w)), we have µ′ 6= µ.
Let µ1, . . . , µL with µ1 = µ−(m,w) and µL = µ′ be a pairwise myopic-farsighted
improving path from µ− (m,w) to µ′. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1. m ∈M \ F.
It holds that µ−(m,w) m µ. Therefore, it follows that µ0, µ1, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ is
a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µ′ and therefore µ′ ∈ h∗(µ).
This contradicts the fact that V is internally stable.
Case 2. m ∈ F.
Since µ′ ∈ h∗(µ − (m,w)) and m ∈ F, it follows as before that µ′(m) m m.
Therefore it holds that µ0, µ1, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ is a pairwise myopic-farsighted
improving path from µ to µ′ and therefore µ′ ∈ h∗(µ). This contradicts the fact that
V is internally stable.
Proof of Theorem 6.
Let V be a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.
For every µ, µ′ ∈ V, it holds that µ′ /∈ h∗(µ). By Lemma 4, µ is individually
rational, so by Theorem 5 we have that µ′ /∈ g∗(µ). This shows that V satisfies
internal stability as defined in Definition 6.
For every µ ∈ M \ V, it holds that h∗(µ) ∩ V 6= ∅. Since h∗(µ) ⊂ g∗(µ), it
follows that g∗(µ) ∩ V 6= ∅. This shows that V satisfies external stability as defined
in Definition 6.
We conclude that V is a coalitional myopic-farsighted stable set.
Let V be a coalitional myopic-farsighted stable set.
For every µ, µ′ ∈ V, it holds that µ′ /∈ g∗(µ). Since h∗(µ) ⊂ g∗(µ), it follows that
µ′ /∈ h∗(µ). This shows that V satisfies internal stability as defined in Definition 2.
We now show that every matching in V is individually rational. Suppose µ ∈ V
is not individually rational. Then there is m ∈M and w ∈ W such that µ(m) = w,
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m m w or w w m. Without loss of generality, assume m m w. It follows
from Lemma 3 that µ /∈ g∗(µ − (m,w)). On the other hand, µ − (m,w) ∈ g∗(µ),
so by µ ∈ V and internal stability of V as defined in Definition 6 it follows that
µ − (m,w) /∈ V. By external stability of V as defined in Definition 6 it holds that
there is µ′ ∈ g∗(µ − (m,w)) such that µ′ ∈ V. Since µ /∈ g∗(µ − (m,w)), we have
µ′ 6= µ.
Let µ1, . . . , µL with µ1 = µ − (m,w) and µL = µ′ be a coalitional myopic-
farsighted improving path from µ− (m,w) to µ′. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1. m ∈M \ F.
It holds that µ−(m,w) m µ. Therefore, it follows that µ0, µ1, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ is
a coalitional myopic-farsighted improving path from µ to µ′ and therefore µ′ ∈ g∗(µ).
This contradicts the fact that V is internally stable as defined in Definition 6.
Case 2. m ∈ F.
Since µ′ ∈ g∗(µ − (m,w)) and m ∈ F, it follows from Lemma 3 that µ′(m) m m.
Therefore it holds that µ0, µ1, . . . , µL with µ0 = µ is a coalitional myopic-farsighted
improving path from µ to µ′ and therefore µ′ ∈ g∗(µ). This contradicts the fact that
V is internally stable as defined in Definition 6.
Consequently, every matching in V is individually rational.
Let some µ ∈M \ V be given. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1. µ ∈ I.
Since V is a coalitional myopic-farsighted stable set, it holds that g∗(µ)∩V 6= ∅. By
Theorem 5 it holds that h∗(µ) = g∗(µ), so h∗(µ) ∩ V 6= ∅.
Case 2. µ ∈M \ I.
We define
D0 = {m ∈M | m m µ(m)},
D1 = {w ∈ W | w w µ(w) and µ(w) /∈ D0},
as the set of men that prefer to be single over their match at µ and the set of women
that are not married to a man in D0 and prefer to be single over their match at µ.
Let D = D0∪D1 and denote the cardinality of D by d ≥ 1. Take an arbitrary order
of the individuals in D, say i0, . . . , id − 1. Define µ0 = µ. For ` ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1}, we
define the matching µ`+1 = µ` − (i`, µ(i`)). We distinguish two subcases.
Subcase 2.1. µd ∈ V.
We show that µ0, . . . , µd is a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µ0 = µ
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to µd ∈ V. Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , d− 1} be given. If i` ∈ N \F, then µ`+1(i`) = i` i`
µ(i`) = µ`(i`). If i` ∈ F, then µd(i`) = i` i` µ(i`) = µ`(i`).
Subcase 2.2 µd /∈ V.
If µd /∈ V, then let µ′ ∈ V be such that µ′ ∈ g∗(µd). The existence of µ′ follows
from the external stability of V according to Definition 6. Since µd is individually
rational by construction, we can use Theorem 5 to conclude that h∗(µd) = g
∗(µd),
so µ′ ∈ h∗(µd). Let µd, µd+1, . . . , µd+L be a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving
path from µd to µd+L = µ
′. We show next that µ0, µ1, . . . , µd+L is a pairwise myopic-
farsighted improving path from µ0 to µd+L.
Let some ` ∈ {0, . . . , d−1} be given. If i` ∈ N \F, then µ`+1(i`) = i` i` µ(i`) =
µ`(i`). If i` ∈ F, then µd+L(i`) i` i` i` µ(i`) = µ`(i`), where the first step uses
the fact that µ′ belongs to V, so is individually rational. For ` ∈ {d, . . . , d + L −
1}, the moving players make a strict improvement in the appropriate sense since
µd, µd+1, . . . , µd+L is a pairwise myopic-farsighted improving path from µd to µd+L.
We have shown that h∗(µ)∩V 6= ∅ and therefore that V satisfies external stability
as defined in Definition 2.
We conclude that V is a pairwise myopic-farsighted stable set.

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